Critical Thinking: A New Definition and Defense

by
Donald L. Hatcher

June 28, 2000

I.       Introduction

For many years, teachers of critical thinking have been faced with a problem: there are numerous definitions of critical thinking. Some are long and tedious, others are short and succinct; some emphasize skills, some dispositions; some emphasize context and world views, some focus on arguments and evidence. But why is this a problem? Why not just “let a thousand flowers bloom?”

First, when we teach critical thinking, what we decide to include and leave out of a course will vary relative to our conception of critical thinking. One needs only to look at the wide variety of critical thinking texts to verify this point. Some focus on informal fallacies (Damer). Some focus on informal analyses of arguments (Johnson and Blair). Some use formal logic as the preferred method of argument evaluation (Cederblom and Paulsen, Hatcher and Spencer). So, unless there is some agreement among teachers over what constitutes critical thinking, critical thinking courses can be expected to be as varied as the definitions.

This creates a problem when universities have a “critical thinking requirement.” Without a clear conception of critical thinking, it is impossible to say what courses satisfy the requirement. Some will claim that a course in written composition with a chapter on the argumentative essay will suffice, while some will argue that a standard course in formal logic will do the trick (Scriven). Conversely, some may argue that formal logic has little or nothing to do with critical thinking, and only courses in informal logic should be included.

A second problem has to do with assessment. Currently, accrediting agencies require schools that claim to teach something to have bona fide assessment programs in place to demonstrate whether or not students have achieved the stated outcome. So, if schools claim that critical thinking is one of their intellectual goals, unless there is agreement on a conception of critical thinking, it becomes very difficult to design standardized tests to evaluate student success or failure. In addition, without validated standardized tests, it remains very difficult for teachers with different approaches to compare pedagogies and outcomes. Without standard evaluation procedures, there is simply no way to know which pedagogies work well and which do not.

Third, without a clear conception of critical thinking it is difficult to convince the unconvinced that enhancing students' critical thinking abilities is an absolutely essential education goal. Vague, tedious, and obtuse definitions are hard to sell to skeptics. If faculty and administrators are not convinced of its value, critical thinking courses will simply not be required. I would suggest that the fact that so few colleges have such a course requirement is a function of not having a widely held, clear, and defensible conception of critical thinking.

So, after a critique of some of the more common definitions of critical thinking, I shall argue for a specific definition that I believe is superior to the alternatives, a definition that does not suffer from the weaknesses of the current conceptions, a conception whose value would be hard to deny.

II.      Some Problematic Definitions

Some will no doubt object that there are many adequate definitions already on the market. After all, what's wrong with Bob Ennis' definition of critical thinking as "reasonable, reflective thinking about what to do and believe"? For one thing, over ten years ago Harvey Siegel criticized Ennis' conception because it focuses entirely on teaching certain "skills, abilities, and proficiencies necessary for the correct evaluation of statements" (6). According to Siegel, and I agree, a skills only conception of critical thinking is flawed because a person could be called a critical thinker but never utilize the skills outside of a test situation (6). An adequate conception of critical thinking must include some notion of a person having specific skills and certain "dispositions, habits of mind, and (even) character traits" (7). To be a critical thinker, a person must be disposed when in the proper circumstances to exercise the skills. (I will try to address this in my own definition.)

Siegel's definition of critical thinking is thinking that is "appropriately moved be reasons" (32). While Harvey's explication of this conception is fairly compelling, as he integrates both skills and dispositions, apart from such a lengthy explication (32-42), the definition as stated seems vague and unappealing. From a practical point of view, it's the sort of definition that would be hard to sell to an administrator for the purposes of instituting a school-wide critical thinking requirement. Second, as Ralph Johnson has pointed out (226), Siegel's definition is too broad. If a driver slammed on the brakes to avoid hitting a deer, that would be an instance of being "appropriately moved by reasons" but not engaging in critical thinking.

There are numerous other definitions in the critical thinking field, but for our purposes, I will only mention and briefly criticized a few of the better known ones.

John McPeck defines critical thinking as "the skill and propensity to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism" (8). Two quick comments, first, "reflective skepticism" is a vague notion and will hardly sell at the local school board meeting or to skeptical administrators. Second, it has a negative connotation, and hence, seems to ignore the constructive aspects of thinking which is appropriately critical. That is, the purpose of critical thinking is not always negative, but is often to arrive at a positive judgment on an issue.

Matt Lipman defines critical thinking as "skillful, responsible thinking that facilitates good judgment because it 1) relies on criteria, 2) is self-correcting and 3) is sensitive to context" (1988). While Lipman's definition is couched in positive terms, I find the notion of "relying on criteria" vague. What sort of criteria are to be included? Are personal feelings appropriate criteria? Do criteria vary? Second, Lipman's concept of "self-correcting" is misleading because, as Ralph Johnson has pointed out in numerous presentations, critical thinking often occurs in a group where the best ideas or criticisms come from others, not one's self. In fact we are often our own worst enemies when it comes to critiquing our ideas.

Richard Paul and Michael Scriven have defined critical thinking as "the intellectual disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observations, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication as a guide to belief and action" (1992). This sounds a lot like a definition by a committee, and is both confusing and unappealing.

III.    What Should a Good Definition of Critical Thinking Include?

Here are ten criteria.

1. It should be as clear and concise as possible so we and the unconvinced know what we are talking about.
2. It should be easy to explicate to faculty and administrators, showing why critical thinking is an essential educational goal.
3. It should refer to the criteria to be used for critical judgment. Otherwise, there will never be agreement over what counts for critical thinking.
4. It should, as Harvey Siegel has pointed out, refer to the appropriate character traits of a critical thinker.
5. It should show that critical thinking has broad educational utility, i.e., is applicable to many disciplines. It should be clear that students in art, literature, political science, or history can benefit from learning to think critically.
6. It should allow people to distinguish critical thinking from other cognitive activities such as creative thinking, problem solving, and logical inference (Johnson: 224).
7. It should make clear what sorts of courses would count for fulfilling a critical thinking requirement and which should be left out. Without such a demarcation, as Michael Scriven has argued, educators succumb to "the prostitution of the critical thinking requirement."
8. It should provide enough guidance so that faculty can construct tests to assess whether or not students have acquired the appropriate skills and dispositions.
9. It should be consistent with the historical understanding of good, as opposed to dogmatic, thinking, a tradition including such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Mill, Dewey, Russell, and Popper.
10. It should be consistent with what is unproblematic in many previous definitions.

IV.     Another Stab at an Adequate Definition of CT

Given these criteria, I believe the following definition is superior to the previous ones offered.

"Critical thinking is thinking that attempts to arrive at a judgment only after honestly evaluating alternatives with respect to available evidence and arguments" (Hatcher and Spencer).

Let’s examine this definition.

1. The definition limits the scope of critical thinking to those areas where evidence and arguments are appropriate. Critical thinking aims at a judgment in any area where a judgment is not simply a matter of individual taste, where the person who makes the claim thinks there are good reasons for holding the position, reasons all can understand and evaluate.
2. The definition also indicates that critical thinking can be an open-ended process. Critical thinking only attempts to arrive at a judgment because sometimes judgment is inappropriate when the available evidence and arguments are insufficient or inconclusive. It implies that in these cases, unless one is forced to make a choice, one should withhold judgment until further inquiry has provided the needed evidence and arguments.
3. The definition points out that CT must include the evaluation of alternatives. This is an important part of this definition. It sets it apart from the others. For any issue, critical thinkers must examine a variety of positions or points of view before making a decision or judgment. Why is this essential?
   1. First examining alternatives adds perspective and credibility to one's judgment. For example, one could not claim to be buying the best automobile if one looked at only one model before making a decision. An unwillingness to examine alternatives would be tantamount to dogmatic thinking or close-mindedness.
   2. It would be naive and presumptuous, especially for issues where there is considerable debate, to assume that one's position was correct without ever evaluating the alternative positions. For example, if a President's advisory commission were attempting to develop a policy for adequate health-care coverage for all citizens, it would be presumptuous for it to decide on a policy without looking carefully at the ways other developed nations deal with the issue of health care.
      
      Thinkers who fail to evaluate the alternatives are assuming infallibility. This is naive because if human history teaches any lesson, it is that humans are fallible. At one time or another, people have been mistaken about almost everything: the nature of the solar system, the causes of disease, the shape of the earth, the risks of nuclear energy, the safety of DDT, and so on.
      
   3. Third, even if one's initial judgment turns out to be the most reasonable, one cannot know it is the most reasonable prior to evaluating the alternatives. Just as car manufacturers have no way of knowing whether their cars are safe until they test them, people have no way of knowing whether their beliefs and values are trustworthy until they evaluate them against the alternatives. (This, of course, is John Stuart Mill's point in On Liberty when he says "Truth gains more even by the error of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself than by the opinions of those who hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think" 41.)
4. The evaluation of alternatives must be honest.
   1. An honest evaluation of alternatives strives for impartiality and objectivity. Regardless of their prior beliefs or feelings about a position, critical thinkers must try to be impartial when evaluating each alternative. Strong feelings either for or against a position or the person who holds it tend to bias one's judgment. That is why articles submitted to professional journals are refereed blindly, and judges and jurors are not allowed to know personally those they try. Consequently, the beliefs we feel most strongly about are the ones of which we should be most critical.
   2. b)An honest evaluation tries to include all available alternatives. If important ones are ignored, the evaluation is biased, and hence not "honest." For example, if hydrogen is not included in a discussion of alternative energy sources for automobiles, then the discussants are not honestly evaluating the alternatives. Their manner of arriving at a decision will be guilty of the Fallacy of False Dilemma.
   3. An honest evaluation of alternatives is fair-minded. That is, each position must be presented in its most favorable light--one that those who agree with the position would accept. Obviously, only when a position is presented favorably can it be evaluated honestly. For example, if one is going to criticize Marx's views of what constitutes a fair distribution of society's benefits and burdens, it would be important to formulate his views in a way that contemporary Marxists would accept. A failure to do so would commit the Straw Person Fallacy.
   4. An honest evaluation of alternatives means that the criteria used to reject an alternative must be applied equally to all other positions. That is, each must be judged by the same standards of rationality. To apply one set of intellectual standards to one's own position and another to someone else's is intellectually dishonest.
   5. Finally, an honest evaluation of alternatives assumes that the inquirers are willing to alter their positions in light of new evidence and arguments. To claim to evaluate a position honestly, and yet not be willing to alter one's position relative to new evidence and arguments makes a mockery of serious inquiry.
5. The last part of the definition indicates the proper standards for evaluation. Judgments that are the product of critical thinking are based only on available evidence and arguments. The importance of basing judgments on evidence and arguments can be appreciated by looking at some alternative ways people form judgments.
   1. Often, people form judgments based on how strongly they feel about an issue. While in personal (especially romantic) relationships, how people feel about another person may be important, personal feelings in other important areas have little to do with what is the most rational choice. In fact, strong feeling tend to bias our judgments.
   2. Some judgments are the product of wishful thinking. Sometimes, rather than holding beliefs because they are warranted by the evidence and arguments, people believe things simply because they will feel better believing them rather than some alternative. For example, some people find thinking about the projected doubling of the earth's population over the next 50 years quite disturbing, so they ignore the evidence and believe there is not a problem.

V.      A Defense of the Definition

Obviously, I believe the "honest evaluation of alternatives" to be a superior conception of critical thinking. How does it measure up against the ten criteria for a good definition?

1. The definition is clear and concise. We know what critical thinkers are about, i.e., the honest evaluation of alternatives.
2. It is easily understood and defensible, and so should be saleable to skeptical administrators and faculty. If liberal education involves introducing students to a variety of competing perspectives from across disciplines, then the honest evaluation of alternatives seems an essential skill for all students. The alternative is dogmatism, confusion, or relativism.
3. It states clearly the criteria for critical judgment, i.e., available evidence and arguments. There is plenty of literature on how to evaluate evidence and arguments.
4. It meets Siegel's criticism of Ennis' definition by implying that the critical thinker must have a specific character trait, i.e., be an honest inquirer.
5. It shows that critical thinking is applicable to any area of inquiry where evidence and arguments are relevant, hence few disciplines can claim to be exempt from such skills.
6. It meets Johnson's criticism that an adequate definition must distinguish critical thinking from other cognitive activities. Simply put, creative thinking, problem solving, or doing formal logic need not involve "the honest evaluation of alternatives." Hence, this definition shows what is distinctive about critical thinking relative to other cognitive activities.
7. The definition meets Scriven's criticism that if a critical thinking requirement is vague, anything will satisfy it. The definition implies that only those courses that involve students in "the honest evaluation of alternatives with respect to available evidence and arguments" will fulfill a critical thinking requirement. English composition and formal logic will not do.
8. Does the definition allow faculty to test students to see if they can indeed evaluate alternative positions with respect to evidence and arguments. I am not sure that any current test or the market does this, but clearly faculty can easily create assignments that ask students to evaluate alternative positions. That is what any good critical paper will do, i.e., argue for a position and show why it is more reasonable than the alternative positions.
9. Is the definition consistent with the history of good thinking as embodied in the works of such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Mill, or Russell? Much could be said about the methods of each of these renowned thinkers, but it seems pretty clear that most of Plato's dialogues are in fact nothing but "the honest evaluation of alternatives." That is what the dialectical method is. Both Aristotle's and Aquinas' works often begin by examining the alternative answers given to a question, and then arguing that one position is better than the others. Mill's On Liberty is one long argument for the social utility of the "honest evaluation of alternatives." Russell's commitment to the scientific approach to philosophy is also an approach that endorses the "honest evaluation of alternatives theories." That is what the history of science is, the critical evaluation of alternative theories. It is also essentially the same as Popper's and others idea of "critical rationality."
10. Finally, critical thinking as "the honest evaluation of alternatives" goes beyond, but is consistent with Ennis' "rational reflective thinking," Siegel's "appropriately moved by reasons," McPeck's "reflective skepticism," and Lipman's "skillful, responsible thinking, the facilitates good judgment." Each of these, I could argue, requires "the honest evaluation of alternatives with respect to available evidence and arguments."

So, while this definition of critical thinking may also have flaws, weaknesses that will no doubt be brought out by critics, it does seem to be superior to the standard alternatives, given the criteria for a good definition of critical thinking. It seems the sort of definition that could drive a critical thinking requirement, allowing instructors and administrators to courses that were indeed critical thinking courses.

Works Cited

Damer, Ed. 1995. Attacking Faulty Reasoning. 3^rd ed. Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth.

Ennis, Robert. 1962. "A Concept of Critical Thinking." Harvard Educational Review. 32: 81-111.

Hatcher, Donald and L. Anne Spencer. 2000. Reasoning and Writing: From Critical Thinking to Composition. Boston: American Press.

Johnson, Ralph. 1996. "The Problem of Defining Critical Thinking." The Rise of Informal Logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.

Johnson, Ralph and Tony Blair. 1994. Logical Self-Defense. New York: McGraw- Hill.

Lipman, Matthew. 1988. "The Concept of Critical Thinking." Teaching Thinking and Problem Solving. 10, #3.

McPeck, John. 1981. Critical Thinking and Education. New York: St. Martin's.

Mill, John Stuart. 1956. On Liberty. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Scriven, Michael. 1991. "Prostitution of the Critical Thinking Requirement." CT News. Volume 10, #2 and 3.

Siegel, Harvey. 1988. Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education. New York: Routledge.